Identification (RFID) systems employ Privacy-Preserving Authentication (PPA) to allow valid readers to explicitly authenticate their dominated tags without leaking private information. Typically, an RF tag sends an encrypted message to the reader, then the reader searches for the key that can decrypt the cipher to identify the tag. Due to the large-scale deployment of today's RFID systems, the key search scheme for any PPA requires a short response time. Previous designs construct balance-tree based key management structures to accelerate the search speed to O(logN), where N is the number of tags. Being efficient, such approaches are vulnerable to compromising attacks. By capturing a small number of tags, compromising attackers are able to identify other tags that have not been corrupted. To address this issue, we propose an AntiCompromising authenticaTION protocol, ACTION, which employs a novel sparse tree architecture, such that the key of every tag is independent from one another. The advantages of this design include: 1) resilience to the compromising attack, 2) reduction of key storage for tags from O(logN) to O(1), which is significant for resource critical tag devices, and 3) high search efficiency, which is O(logN), as good as the best in the previous designs.
INTRODUCTION
Due to the low cost and easy deployment, RadioFrequency Identification (RFID) has been an important enabling technology for everyday applications, such as retailing, medical-patient management, access control [1] , logistics and supply chain management [2, 3] . In RFID systems, RF tags emit their unique serial numbers to RF readers. Without privacy protection, however, any reader can identify a tag ID via the emitted serial number. Indeed, a malicious reader can easily perform bogus authentications with detected tags to retrieve sensitive information within its scanning range. Currently, many companies embed RF tags into items. As these tags contain unique information about the items, a customer carrying the tags is subject to silent tracking from unauthorized readers. Sensitive personal information might be also leaked: details about an illness inferred by the purchase of certain pharmaceutical products; the malls she shops at; the types of items she prefers to buy, and so on. Clearly, a secure RFID system must meet two requirements.
First, valid readers must be able to identify valid tags. Second, misbehaving readers should not be able to retrieve private information from valid tags.
In order to protect privacy, Privacy-Preserving Authentication (PPA) is introduced into the interactive procedure between RFID readers and tags [4] . To achieve PPA, an RFID tag performs a cryptography enabled challengingresponse procedure with a reader [5] . For example, we can let each tag share a key with the reader. During authentication, the reader first probes a tag via a query message with a nonce. Instead of answering the query in plaintext, the tag replies to the reader with the encrypted nonce. The reader searches all the keys that it holds in the back-end database. If the tag is valid, the reader can find a proper key to recover the authentication message, and thereby identify the tag. (For simplicity, we use the term "reader" to denote the reader device as well as the back-end database in the following). Using PPA, any invalid tag will not be accepted since it cannot provide a proper cipher related to a key owned by the reader. Meanwhile, the valid tag does not expose its identity to any third party in PPAs since only valid readers know the key used for encrypting messages. A malicious reader cannot identify a user via probing the valid tag.
Although it is simple and secure, such a PPA based design suffers poor scalability. Upon receiving a nonce cipher, the reader needs a prompt lookup to locate a key in the database. Clearly, the search complexity is O(N), where N is the number of all the possible tags, even only a small portion of them are in the reader's range. In today's large-scale RFID systems, N is often as large as hundreds of millions, and thousands of tags may respond to a reader simultaneously, demanding a fast keysearch method as well as a carefully designed key-storage structure. Hence, balance-tree based schemes [6] [7] [8] [9] employ key-sharing infrastructure to accelerate the authentication procedure, in which the lookup complexity is O(logN).
The balance-tree based approaches are efficient, nevertheless, not secure due to the key-sharing infrastructure. As the infrastructure used by those approaches is static, each tag, more or less, shares some common keys with other tags (in this paper, we use normal tags to denote tags that are not tampered with). Consequently, compromising one tag might reveal information of other tags [6, 9] . L. Lu, et al evaluate the damage caused by the compromising attack to balance-tree based approaches [9] . By compromising only twenty tags, an adversary can achieve a nearly 100% probability of This full text paper was peer reviewed at the direction of IEEE Communications Society subject matter experts for publication in the IEEE INFOCOM 2009 proceedings.
978-1-4244-3513-5/09/$25.00 ©2009 IEEEsuccessfully track normal tags in a balance-tree based RFID system containing 2 20 tags [10] . L. Lu, et al propose a dynamic key-updating scheme [9] , SPA, for balance-tree base approaches to mitigate the impact of compromising attacks. SPA reduces the number of keys shared among compromised and normal tags, and alleviates the damage caused by compromising attacks. SPA, however, does not eliminate the impact of compromising attacks. For instance, using SPA in an RFID system with 2 20 tags, the probability of tracking normal tags is close to 60% after an adversary compromises twenty tags [9] .
Another drawback for balance-tree based PPAs is the large space needed for storing keys in each tag. Balance-tree based approaches require each tag to hold O(log δ N) keys, and the reader to store δ × N keys, where δ is a branch factor of the key tree. Due to the limited memory capacity of RF tags, existing PPAs are difficult to apply in current RFID systems.
In order to address the above issues, we propose an AntiCompromising authenticaTION protocol, called ACTION. By employing a sparse tree to organize keys, ACTION generates completely independent keys for tags, so that compromised tags have no keys that correlate with the normal ones. As a result, ACTION can effectively defend against compromising attacks. We show that if an attacker can track a normal tag with a probability larger than α, it must tamper with more than N -1/α tags, while in previous balance-tree based approaches, by compromising O(logN) tags, an attacker can track a normal tag with a probability close to 100% [10] . Another salient feature of this design is the low storage requirement for tags. ACTION only allows each tag to store two keys and the reader to store O(N) keys, achieving high storage efficiency for both readers and tags, making this design practical for today's RF tags. We also show that ACTION retains high search efficiency in the sense that the lookup complexity is still O(logN), as good as the best of previous designs.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We discuss the related work in Section II. We present the ACTION protocol in Section III. In Section IV, we discuss the storage and search efficiency of ACTION. We present the security analysis in Section V, and conclude the work in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
The fundamental principle of PPAs is based on HashLock [5] , in which every tag shares a unique key with the reader. A tag and the reader use a challenging-response scheme to conduct authentication. Recent study [11] shows that HashLock is a secure PPA. The main drawback of HashLock is that the key search is linear to the number of tags in the system, which limits the usage of HashLock in large-scale RFID systems. Subsequent approaches in the literature are mostly aimed at improving the efficiency of key search. Juels [12] classifies those approaches into three categories.
Synchronization approaches: Such approaches [13] [14] [15] [16] use an incremental counter to record the state of authentication. When an authentication is successfully performed, the tag increases the counter by one. The reader compares the value of a tag's counter with the record in the database. If the difference of the two counter values is in a proper window, the tag is viewed as valid and the reader synchronizes the counter record of the tag. Synchronization schemes are subject to the desynchronization attack [11] , in which a malicious reader interrogates a tag many times such that the counter of the tag exceeds the range of the window and the reader fails to recognize a valid tag. Balance-tree based approaches: Balance-tree based approaches [6] [7] [8] [9] improve the key search efficiency from linear complexity to logarithmic complexity. They employ a balancetree to organize and store keys for tags. In a balance-tree, each node stores a unique key. Keys in the path from the root to a leaf node are distributed to a tag. Each tag uses these multiple keys to encrypt the identification message. Upon receiving an encrypted message, the reader performs a Depth-First Search on the key tree with a logarithmic complexity of the system size. The balance-tree based approaches, however, are subject to the compromising attack [6, 9] . In a balance-tree, tags always share keys with others. Hence, hacking one tag may reveal several keys used by other tags. For example, in a binary balance-tree based RFID system containing 2 20 tags, an adversary can identify any tag with the probability of about 90% by tampering with only twenty tags [9, 10] . To address a compromising attack, L. Lu, et al propose a dynamic keyupdating scheme, SPA [9] , for enhancing balance-tree based approaches. In SPA, the reader dynamically and recursively updates keys in the key tree and coordinates the keys with the tag after a successful identification. The key-updating scheme reduces the probability of locating a tag via compromising attacks. However, the threat from compromising attacks has not been completely relieved. For instance, in a SPA system containing 2 20 tags, an adversary can still recognize any normal tag with a high probability (about 60%) after it tampers with twenty tags [9] .
III. ACTION DESIGN
In this section, we first discuss the motivation of this work, and then present the details of the ACTION protocol.
A. Motivation
In previous balance-tree based approaches, initially, a reader organizes a hierarchical balance-tree with a depth of log δ N (δ is branching factor), in which each node is assigned a unique key. The reader then monogamously maps N leaf nodes to N tags. Figure 1 plots a balance-tree for eight tags. For each tag, there is a unique shortest path from the root to the corresponding leaf node. For example, in Fig. 1 , the tag T 3 obtains k 1, 1 , k 2, 2 , and k 3, 3 . During authentication, upon receiving a request with a nonce r from the reader, T 3 
encrypts
This full text paper was peer reviewed at the direction of IEEE Communications Society subject matter experts for publication in the IEEE INFOCOM 2009 proceedings. r in the way {k 1, 1 {r}, k 2, 2 {r}, k 3, 3 {r}} and sends the ciphers to the reader. Upon receiving the response from T 3 , the reader searches proper keys in the key tree to recover r. This is equal to exploring a path from the root to the leaf node of T 3 in the tree. At the end of identification, if such a path exists, R regards T 3 as a valid tag. Clearly, the search complexity is O(logN).
The fundamental nature of balance-tree based PPAs is that a tag shares some non-leaf nodes, more or less, with other tags in the key tree. This is a fatal flaw when balance-tree based PPAs are under the compromising attack. For example, in Fig.  1 , we can see that a common key, k 1, 1 , is shared by tags T 1 , T 2 , T 3 , and T 4 , and k 2, 2 is shared by T 3 and T 4 . If an adversary compromises T 3 and reveals the keys stored in T 3 , the keys k 1, 1 and k 2, 2 are also exposed. As a result, even though T 4 is not cracked, the attacker can easily distinguish T 4 via k 1, 1 and k 2, 2 . Even worse, the adversary can actually distinguish each normal tag by only compromising a small fraction of all tags.
Recently, L. Lu, et al propose a dynamic key-updating method, SPA [9] , which mitigates the impact of the compromising attack. SPA updates a tag's keys from the leaf node to the root in the key tree. Each non-leaf node uses a number of state bits to record the key-updating status of its children. The 'old' keys that are used by other tags will be stored into temporary caches. The non-leaf node automatically updates its own keys if all its children have updated their keys. Compared to non-key-updating approaches, SPA is more secure because it reveals fewer keys shared between a compromised tag and normal tags to adversaries.
Using SPA, however, the probability that compromising attacks succeed [9] is still large, more than 50% in general cases. That is, for an RFID system containing 2 20 tags, an adversary only needs to compromise 20 tags before it is able to distinguish any tag from others with a probability larger than 50%. The main reason is that the dependence among the keys of different tags is remaining. SPA reduces the number of keys correlating to normal tags, but the tags always share keys in balanced tree structure. Hence, tags are still threatened by compromising attacks.
Based on the above analysis, it is clear that the only solution to compromising attacks is to eliminate the correlation among the keys of different tags. Therefore, in this design, we intend to remove all correlations among the keys. The difficulty is that we cannot sacrifice the search efficiency as well as the storage efficiency.
B. Overview
ACTION has four components: system initialization, tag identification, key-updating, and system maintenance. In the first component, instead of using a balance-tree, we employ a sparse tree to organize keys for tags. We generate two random keys (128 bits) for each tag, denoted as leaf key k l , and path key k p , respectively. The k p is corresponding to a path in the sparse tree according to its value. Each tag is associated with a leaf node in the tree after the key initialization. The leaf node thereby holds the key k l assigned to the tag, and the path from the root to the leaf node indicates the key k p . Since the two keys are randomly generated, keys among different tags are independent. In the second component, the reader performs a logarithmic search to identify a tag. In the third component, ACTION performs a key-updating procedure, in which ACTION employs a cryptographic hash function, such as MD5, SHA-1, to update the old key in a tag. Note that the new key is still random and independent of the keys used by other tags. ACTION also reduces the maintenance overheads in highly dynamic systems where tags join or leave frequently by using the fourth component.
C. System Initialization
We assume that there are N tags
, and a reader R in the RFID system. We denote the sparse tree used in ACTION as S. Let δ denote the branching factor of the key tree and d denote the depth of the tree. Each tag is associated with a leaf node in S. The secret keys shared by tag T i and reader R are denoted as k i p and k i l . Let n be the length of k i p and
We set the branching factor, δ, of each non-leaf node in S as 2 n/d , namely d×logδ = n. For example, if we set the key length as 128 bits and d = 32, the branching factor of the S is δ = 2 128/32 = 2 4 = 16. In other words, each non-leaf node is able to accommodate 16 child positions in S. If the c-th child node exists in a child position of a non-leaf node j, we set c as the index number of this child and record c in j. Note that a non-leaf node only stores the index numbers for existing children.
For simplicity, we denote the set of j's index numbers as IS j , and the element number of IS j as IN j , that is, IN j = |IS j |. We show an example in Fig. 2 , in which the branching factor δ is 2 4 . Each non-leaf node has sixteen child positions. For a non-
k Figure 1 . An example of key organization in balance-tree based PPAs. This full text paper was peer reviewed at the direction of IEEE Communications Society subject matter experts for publication in the IEEE INFOCOM 2009 proceedings. leaf node a, as shown in Fig. 2 , the reader maintains its' index number set as IS a = {5, 7}, and the IN a =2.
Initially, the tree is empty. Reader R generates two keys k i p and k i l uniformly at random for every tag T i . Meanwhile, the reader divides each Fig. 2 , the branching factor δ of S is 16, and there are four tags in the system, denoted as T 1 , T 2 , T 3 , and T 4 . Assume that the length of path key is twelve bits. Each path key is divided into three parts, and the length of each part is four bits (because δ = 16, the length of each part of a key should be log 2 . Indeed, the key organization is analogous to generating a path in tree S. In the above example, the path of T 1 is root→a→b→c. After the same procedures on tags T 2 , T 3 , and T 4 , we obtain a sparse tree as illustrated in Fig. 2 . The procedure is described in Algorithm 1 TagJoin.
D. Tag Identification
) includes three phases, as illustrated in Fig. 3 . In the first phase, the reader R sends a "Request" with a random number r 1 (a nonce) to tag T i . In the second phase, upon receiving "Request", tag T i generates a random number r 2 (a nonce) and calculates a series of hash values, h(r 1 , r 2 ,
, where h(r 1 , r 2 , k) denotes the output of the hash function on three inputs: a key k and two random numbers r 1 and r 2 . T i replies R with a message U = (r 2 , h(r 1 , r 2 ,
In the third phase, R identifies T i using the key tree S and the received U.
Reader R invokes a recursive algorithm to probe a path from the root to a leaf in S to identify T i as shown in Algorithm 2. Assume R reaches a non-leaf node a at level m-1. For all index numbers stored in a, R computes the hash values with inputs r 1 , r 2 , and the index numbers. R then compares the hash values with the element v m in the received U. If there is a match, the path of T i should be extended to the child related to the index number. Note that here the child node is on the path assigned to T i . Repeating such a procedure until arriving at a leaf node, R recognizes the tag T i . For the example shown in Fig. 2 , upon receiving a "Request" message with a random r 1 , T 1 generates a random number r 2 , and computes a series of hash values h(r 1
). After receiving U, R computes all h(r 1 , r 2 , x) to compare with v 1 . Here x = 2, 5, and 7, which are all the index numbers stored in the root. Clearly, R locates 2 as a match number and thereby moves to node a. Then R locates 5 and 7 in the nodes b and node c, respectively. R terminates its path probing when it reaches the leaf node c, and hence identifying T 1 .
E. Key-Updating
After successfully identifying T i , R and T i automatically update the key stored in T i and coordinate the changes to the tree S as follows.
R makes use of a cryptographic hash function h to generate new keys. Let k i p and k i l be the current path key and leaf key k . Otherwise, some tag identifications can be interrupted, since the index number stored in non-leaf nodes might be shared among multiple tags.
To address the challenge, we design two algorithms for key-updating: TagJoin shown in Algorithm 1 and TagLeave shown in Algorithm 3. The basic idea is that we first use the TagLeave to remove the path corresponding to old path key k i p of tag T i , and then generate a new path corresponding to key p i k in S. It is possible that a non-leaf node in the path has multiple branches so that some keys are used by other tags, for example, node a in Fig. 2 . In this case, the TagLeave algorithm terminates.
After deleting the old key, R re-generates a new path for tag T i according to the new key k has been generated in the system. The probability of this situation happening is quite small. First, the sparse tree is a virtual tree according to the initialization algorithm. Prior to the tag deployment, the tree is empty. When a path key is generated by a hash function, a path from a certain leaf to the root emerges accordingly in the sparse tree. Therefore, a path in the sparse tree corresponds to a hash value. This correspondence leads to two facts: 1) the capability of a sparse tree is as large as the size of the hash value space. In our work, a path key is a hash value with a length of 128 bits, which indicates the sparse tree can hold 2 128 paths at its maximum, that is, the sparse tree can hold 2 128 tags correspondingly. In any practical RFID system, however, the number of tags is much less than 2 128 . The probability that the tree becomes dense is negligible. 2) A path in the sparse tree corresponds to a hash value. Therefore, if two tags have the same path in the sparse tree, a hash collision appears. According to the collision-resistance property of hash functions, the probability of a hash collision happening is also negligible. For example, an RFID system contains 2 20 tags, and the length of a path key is 128 bits. The ratio of occupied paths in the sparse tree is 2 -88 (2 20 /2 128 ), and the path key is generated uniformly at random. Thus, the probability of generating an existing path is 2 -88 . It is safe to claim that the probability of two tags having a similar path is negligible based on the above analysis.
If such a collision does happen, in this design, R first generates a new key ) , , , returns an error to the user.
F. System Maintenance
This component is mainly for tag joining and leaving. If a new tag T i joins the system, R needs to find a new path in the key tree by invoking the TagJoin algorithm. In detail, R generates a new path key k i p and leaf key k i l independent to other keys, then splits [m]-th child of j (if this child does not exist, R creates it). When a leaf node is reached, R associates T i to the leaf node, and sets the key of the leaf node as k i l . A new path is generated for T i . To withdraw a tag T i , R should erase the path from the root to T i 's associated leaf node by using the TagLeave algorithm. Starting from the associated leaf node of T i , R removes the path upwards. At the beginning, R deletes the leaf key k i l of T i . If R reaches a node e at level m, R first finds e's parent f, and then deletes k i p [m] from the index set IS f . After arriving at node f, R deletes e. R repeats this procedure until a non-leaf node in the path has multiple branches, for example, node a in Fig. 2 . Thus, R withdraws T i .
IV. EFFICIENCY We first investigate the storage efficiency of ACTION, and then analyze the identification efficiency by estimating the
necessary number of hash computations. We also discuss the lower and upper bounds of ACTION's identification efficiency.
A. Storage
An RFID tag normally has a very tiny memory for storing user information as well as the keys. Hence, storage efficiency must be taken into account in designing secure PPA protocols.
Without loss of generality, we assume that keys used by PPA protocols have an identical length, for example 64 bits, for security consideration. In balance-tree based approaches, each tag is allocated multiple keys, which incur a relatively large storage overhead. ACTION is more efficient in the key storage on both the tag and reader sides. On the tag side, ACTION allocates each tag only two keys, a path key and a leaf key. On the reader side, each path key is divided into several fractions and stored in the non-leaf nodes' index sets. Thus, R only stores 2N keys. In contrast, balance-tree based approaches distribute O(log δ N) keys to each tag, and maintain δ × N keys on the reader side, where δ is the branching factor of the balance key tree. Therefore, ACTION is more practical for current RFID systems.
B. Identification Efficiency
The basic operations in a PPA authentication are hash computations and comparisons. The numbers of these two operations are equal, because each hash computation is followed by a comparison of hash values. Hence, we use the number of hash computations to estimate the time complexity. We present the best and worst cases in ACTION's authentication procedure, which are the computational lower bound and upper bound, respectively.
In the best case, the reader always meets a non-leaf node with only one index number at each level in the key tree. After d steps probing, the reader successfully identifies a tag. With the same branching factor setting δ, the depth of sparse tree is larger than the balance-tree, that is, d > log δ N. Therefore, the computational lower bound of ACTION's identification is log δ N.
As we assume the branching factor of the key tree is δ, each non-leaf node has at most δ children. In the worst case, at the root, the reader will compute δ hash values, and narrow the search scope to N/δ tags; at a child node of the root, the reader performs δ hash computations again. Then the reader narrows the search scope to N/δ 2 tags. At each level, the reader conducts δ hash computations. The reader repeats the same process at each level. At a given level l, the reader narrows the search scope to N/δ l tags, and performs l·δ hash computations. We assume at level l, the reader finds N/δ l = 1, or l = log δ N. Since d > log δ N, the reader does not reach leaf nodes at level l. We assume that the reader reaches a non-leaf node a at level l. The node a must have only one child (if a has two children, the number of tags in the system must be N+1, not N). Similar to a, each node of a's offspring has only one child. Thus, the reader will perform d -l hash computations below the level l. We illustrate the worst case in Fig. 4 .
We calculate hash computations in the worst case,
In equation (2), n is the bit length of keys in the system; in ACTION, n = 128. Let E ACTION denote the efficiency of identification. We get log δ N) . We plot the curve of the efficiency upper bound f(δ) in Fig. 5 .
To find the optimal δ, we set f'(δ) = 0. We get
By solving equation (3), we find that δ = 8 is the optimal setup for identification efficiency. The upper bound is Combined with the early discussion, we can see that the time complexity of ACTION authentication is O(logN). This full text paper was peer reviewed at the direction of IEEE Communications Society subject matter experts for publication in the IEEE INFOCOM 2009 proceedings.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
The essential goal of ACTION is to protect the privacy and defend against both passive and active attacks. These attacks are always the most important concerns in wireless environments [20] [21] [22] . For RFID systems, passive attack often means eavesdropping on the communication between tag T and reader R, which are intensively discussed in previous designs [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] . Active attackers can forge, replay, or discard the messages exchanged between T and R, so the attacks include tracking, cloning, and tag-compromising [7, 19] . Attackers are even able to execute bogus authentication procedures. As ACTION has most of the advantages of early designs, it is inherently able to defend against passive attacks. Hence, in this section, we focus more on the ACTION's resistance to the compromising attack, which is the most serious threat to RFID systems but not addressed by early studies.
A. Compromising Attack
We present an attack model to formalize the capability of adversaries based on Avoine's [19] model. We create an interactive game G for two participants: an adversary A (the attacker) and a challenger C (the RFID system). Any attack to the RFID system can be represented as A's querying on one of C's oracles as follows:
Query ( 
Execution(T, R):
A acts as a man-in-the-middle and executes an instance of the authentication protocol P with T and R, respectively. A then modifies the response messages and relays them to both sides accordingly.
Reveal(T):
A compromises T, which means A obtains T's keys. Note that A can distinguish any given tag T from other tags if it can obtain T's keys.
Based on these oracles, the detailed procedure of game G between A and C consists of the following steps.
1. A interacts with C by accessing the above four oracles in polynomial time. In fact, adversary A performs a learning procedure on the system. 2. A informs C that the game has begun. C chooses two normal tags T 0 and T 1 . Based on Definition 1, for a given PPA based protocol P, we define the advantage of a compromising adversary by
The advantage is a measurement of how successful an adversary can distinguish a tag from others. In our model, we assume that only two tags are normal and all other tags have been compromised. In this case, if the adversary can distinguish a normal tag from another one with a probability larger than 1/2, by using the obtained keys from compromised tags, we claim that the adversary has the advantage, and the value is determined by the difference between the probability and 1/2.
B. Defending Against Compromising Attacks
Based on the model, we formally prove that ACTION protocol is private under the compromising attack, which means an adversary has a negligible advantage when it conducts compromising attacks on the ACTION. Theorem 1. Let q Q , q S , and q E be the number of queries to the Query, Send and Execute oracles, respectively. ACTION is private under the compromising attack, and the advantage of a compromising adversary A is bounded by
even if all other tags, except T 0 and T 1 , in the system have been compromised by A, where d is the number of the key parts (or the depth of the key tree), and n is the bits number of a hash value as aforementioned in Section III. C.
Proof: In this proof, we use the random oracle (RO) model [23] , in which hash functions are treated as arbitrary random functions. Since all keys in ACTION are generated independently, the keys of a tag are not related to those in other tags. We denote the game between the challenger C and the adversary A as G 0 .
We introduce another challenger C', (who plays a simulated game G 1 with the adversary A), to simulate the real challenger C, and make them indistinguishable to A. Thus, between reader R and tag T. Therefore, in the procedure of performing Execute oracle, there are two stages: A communicates with T, which can be abstracted as Query oracle, and A communicates with R, which can be abstracted as Send oracle. Hence, the Execute oracle can be considered as the combination of Query and Send oracles. An access to Execute can also be regarded as an access to Query oracle plus an access to Send oracle. We thereby treat q E Execute queries as q E Query and q E Send oracle accesses, respectively. G 1 is same as G 0 , except the constructions of the Query, Send and Execute oracles. In G 1 , from the viewpoint of A, C' simulates C perfectly except one event happens: a hash collision occurs in the output of the hash function. When the RO h' receives (r 1 , r 2 , k) and (r 2 , r 1 , k) as inputs, the two outputs should be identical in G 0 . In G 1 , however, the outputs of h' would not be identical. Thus, C' cannot answer A's query correctly. We define such a situation as an Exception. The probability of an Exception happening is bounded by the birthday paradox: (4) Note that the (d+1)(q E +q Q ) denotes the number of accesses to h'. Those accesses to h' are generated by q E +q Q Query oracle accesses, and each Query oracle access includes d+1 accesses to h'. Since in each Send oracle access, there are four accesses to h', the number of accesses to h' in accessing the Send oracle is 4(q E +q S ), where n is the number of bits of a hash value, and d is the number of the divided parts of each tag's key.
As discussed at the beginning of the proof, the advantage of A in G 1 is zero. Therefore, considering the probability of Event happens, the advantage of the compromising adversary is bounded by: Since q E , q Q , and q S are polynomial to n, the advantage of compromising attackers approximates 0. That is, in the extreme case, even if a compromising attacker has captured N -2 tags, the probability of distinguishing a normal tag from another one is still 1/2. In general, assume the attacker has tampered with t tags. To distinguish a normal tag, the attacker has to perform random guessing on N -t normal tags, and the probability of correctly guessing, so the probability of a successful attack is 1/ (N -t) .
We compare the successful probabilities of compromising attacks in balance-tree based approaches, SPA, and ACTION. In this comparison, we assume SPA and balance-tree based approaches use binary trees. The RFID system contains 2 20 tags. As shown in Fig. 6 , in SPA and other balance-tree based approaches, compromising attackers have an overwhelming probability of distinguishing any normal tag after they tamper
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